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THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
DROUGHT AND FAMINE IN THE DRY ZONE

RANDALL BAKER

T his paper concerns the changing climate in

relief and the immediate problems of keeping
alive a large number of people on the edge of
extinction. But this crisis-management approach, usually associated with natural disasters such as floods, famines, and earthquakes,
presupposes that we are coping with an
anomalous and sudden visitation and that, if
we can carry the population through the
immediate disaster, there is a reasonable
chance that they can reestablish something
resembling a "normal" life again. What has
concerned many writers about Africa is the
almost unbroken persistence of drought since
1968 and of dry conditions for the last twentyfive years (Lamb, P. J. 1982; Nicholson 1983)
and the fear that there is an underlying natural
or human-induced process at work preventing
a return to "normality." Nicholson (1983)
examines the possibilities of changed surface
conditions intensifying and prolonging the
drought. Hence the authorities would have to
plan for a worsening situation in the long
term. Indeed, the absence of much attention to
the drought in the early 1980s might suggest
that people are adapting to it or that it has
become accepted as "normal" even though
conditions have rivaled those in the depths of
the early 1970s.

the semiarid regions of Africa and the technological response to it. Often the central issue in
physical and social change in Africa seems to
be interpreting a sketchy but rapidly evolving
base of "evidence" and trying to decide the
process that the evidence would suggest is at
work. This is a far from easy task, requiring
inspired guesswork as much as proof, but
clearly it is absolutely central to formulating an
appropriate policy response.
One thing is indisputably clear: the circumstances in the semiarid belt stretching from
Senegal to Ethiopia and to places in eastern
and southeastern Africa have reached catastrophic human proportions. No one who
looks at television or reads a newspaper can
fail to have noticed that. Furthermore, because
of the catastrophic level of human suffering
our attention not unnaturally is focused on
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But complicating matters even beyond this
"will it get better or not?" level of debate is the
other question of "what is causing the present
crisis?" There are those who suggest that we
are dealing with an aberration in the global
atmospheric circulation, causing a failure in
the essentially monsoonal rain systems of these
areas. Some of these workers postulate a longterm (two hundred-year) cyclical phenomenon
reaching its trough around the year 2025
(Lamb, H. H. 1983). Others suggest that
evidences of earlier droughts of similar intensity indicate that this one is nothing too far
out of the "ordinary" and that our expectations may be too much influenced by a wetter
phase during the 1950s (Kerr 1985). Of course,
the fact that there are many more people
around today still drawing their subsistence
from the natural environment than there were
during those earlier occurrences-though
many of them have been driven away between
1968 and now-may make the impact of the
drought that much more terrible. But it does
not make it in any way a fundamentally
different process. Then there are those, perhaps best exemplified by Kenneth Hare in his
paper to the United Nations Conference on
Desertification held in Nairobi in 1977, who
say there is no evidence to "prove" climatic
change, which is not the same thing as saying
that it is not happening.
So one group says there is a major systemic
climatic change process, another says it is just
more of the same (drought is "normal"), and a
third group says we cannot prove anything. Of
course, choosing among these theories for
Africa is severely constrained by the short
period of time for which data have been
collected. There are almost no reliable records
of climatic phenomena in the semiarid region
much before 1900, and indeed much later in
many places. Thus much of the "evidence" is
of a secondary nature (lake levels, tree rings,
varves, and the like) and this gives rise to
internecine disputes in the scientific community on the nature of evidence and the
confusion of cause and effect.
The school of thought encouraged some-

what by Hare's often misinterpreted "not
proven" verdict has focused on the issue of
mismanagement. Briefly, this theory states
that the combination of growing human and
animal population (Worldwatch Institute 1985
puts the blame squarely on this factor); the
expansion of people into marginal and fragile
environments such as woodlands, hillslopes,
and river margins; inappropriate technology
(such as the mouldboard plow used in Dust
Bowl days); and the colonial and postcolonial
preoccupation with monocultures of export
crops have all contributed to' create a severe
ecological imbalance leading to land exhaustion, degradation, and erosion. On the one
hand, it is said, this can lead to the appearance
of "desertification" in much the same way that
a worsening climate can. Furthermore, the
degraded state of the environment means that
when droughts come along, as they usually do
in the semiarid belt, then their impact will be
that much greater because there is less intrinsic
resiliance in the system to withstand them.
Secondly, they argue, largely with the aid of
computer models of the atmosphere, that the
mismanagement of the land can, in itself, lead
to climatic change resulting from increased
albedo (Charney 1975), or dust in the atmosphere (McLeod 1976), or a reduction in soil
moisture reducing the release of latent heat to
the atmosphere (Walker and Rowntree 1973)
and preventing the "triggering" effect of the
moisture-laden air masses passing over the
savannas and Sahel from the coast. Scientists
label such relationships the bio-geophysical
feedback effect.
Although some writers (Kerr 1985) boldly
dismiss the mismanagement argument simply
on the basis of the scale of the present drought
and its extent in Africa, it is quite possible that
what we are dealing with is a combination of
climatic phenomena and mismanagement, but
what we cannot be sure about is whether the
climatic circumstances are part of a long-term
deterioration that would seriously reduce the
options open to the policymakers. They, like
much of the scientific community, are extremely confused by the conflicting "evi-
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dence," or the "Information Crisis," as I
termed it (Baker 1976a). On the one hand, the
climatic-change argument is attractive because
it absolves policymakers from any shadow of
blame or responsibility and renders the whole
thing, in the language of insurance policies, an
act of God. But clearly assembling and unscrambling the evidence is important whether
one is thinking of rehabilitation or retreat.
Norman Rosenberg demonstrates the rise in
temperature associated with, possibly, the
increase in CO, in the atmosphere and goes on
to explore the various, sometimes conflicting,
consequences this might or might not have for
the granary of much of the world, the Midwest
(Rosenberg 1986). How much greater then is
the difficulty of extrapolation of effect or
response in Africa with much poorer data, a
monsoonal system, far fewer options, and a
base of very little capital to insulate the
grower?
Technological adaptation and innovation
in the Great Plains area is reviewed, but with
very little predictive extrapolations, by the
Office of Science and Technology (OTA
1983). Technology can be a very wild card
indeed. Major studies of the Great Plains fifty
and twenty years ago, respectively, assumed
that there was little or no further potential for
irrigation in the Great Plains (Great Plains
Committee 1936; Ottoson, et. a!. 1966). They
could not have foreseen the tremendous
advances in center pivot irrigation which now
supplies water to the majority of the Nebraska
corn crop. On the other hand, much of the
water technology translated from the United
States to Africa in the 1960s and 1970s is
thought to have helped induce overgrazing
and widespread land destruction. Similarly,
the enormous effort in genetic research in
grain crops, widely associated with the "Green
Revolution" and India's progress toward selfsufficiency in food production, has not found
its parallel in Africa. There the millets and
sorghums remained largely neglected, primarily because they were not part of the colonial
cash crop package. At the same time, work
advanced on cocoa, coffee, and cotton. But

the crops that kept many Africans alive,
especially in the semiarid regions, remained
virtually untouched. There has not been a
simliar green revolution for Africa and indeed
one would be difficult because of the cost of
irrigation, pesticides, fertilizer, and hybrid seed
for some of the poorest and least commercialized farmers in the world. The reasons why a
food revolution of Asian proportions has not
occurred in Africa have recently been outlined, and there is a reluctance to suggest the
same sort of technological breakthrough in the
African situation (Norman 1985). The conceptual difficulties of coping with the African
dilemma are clearly very great indeed, especially as so much attention has to be directed
instead towards simply staying alive.
THE CLIMATIC CHANGE ARGUMENT

Research work on climatic change in
Africa is still in its infancy and investigations
are revealing not only new insights into the
possible underlying processes but also into the
historical precedents for the incidence, extent,
and severity of drought. These trends have
been reviewed by Nicholson (1983). Apart
from the sources provided by oral tradition,
which are bound to be anecdotal and difficult
to verify, workers have had to rely on such
secondary evidence as the observable record of
changes in the level of basins of inland
drainage like Lake Chad. Writers and travelers
in the nineteenth century, notably David
Livingstone, wrote frequently of Africa "drying up." On a more rigorously scientific basis,
the study of lake margins combined with oral
tradition (migrations, famines, etc.) suggests at
least two other periods of drought comparable
in intensity to what is happening now; the first
was between 1736 and 1758 and the second
between 1820 and 1840. At least two other
incidences of major drought have been recorded this century, the last being in the 1940s.
However, on the evidence available, it would
seem that the past fifteen years or so (since
1968) have been the worst in about one
hundred and fifty years. In some ways the
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wetter years of the 1950s appear exceptional.
Since only six of the twenty or so recording
stations were established before 1940, the
overall record may be distorted by that of the
1950s.
Of course, it is possible only to compare on
the basis of observable effect because a record
of precipitation does not exist. This comparison is a problematic exercise since factors other
than the direct impact of a shortfall in
precipitation can influence the parameters
used as a guide. Overgrazing can cause species
changes in grasslands just as can intensifying
aridity; inland drainage basins can be affected
by factors relating to land use in the catchment
area, such as a change in crop type or in land
use intensity. Clearly a study of process is
made very problematic when the evidence is
subject to so many possible influences. Similar
difficulties face workers like Hubert Lamb,
who not only have to rely on secondary data,
but also upon the use of intercontinental
extrapolations into very different climatic
systems from studies-made usually in the
temperate zones-as and where the data
sources may be found.
Recent research, which is attempting to
correlate precipitation patterns directly to
observable phenomena elsewhere, has suggested two possible areas of causality in
relation to Africa. The first of these links the
changes in the incidence of the EI Nino
current in the Pacific with rainfall in the
southeastern part of Africa. Thus a colder
than normal Pacific brings wetter conditions
to the area. Alternatively, for the sixthousand-mile stretch of semiarid Sub-Saharan
Africa in the north, there exists ths possibility
that changes in surface temperature over the
Atlantic south of WON is in some way
associated with changes in the rainfall conditions in the Sahel famine belt. All this, of
course, begs the broader question of what
brings about these fluctuations in the spatial
distribution of ocean temperatures, but at least
the confirmation of some causal link would
provide the scientific community with a predictive tool.

We are still left, however, with the additional problem of how far drought is an
unavoidable consequence of uncontrollable
natural forces and to what extent it is aggravated or accentuated by the land-using or
atmosphere-modifying activities of man. There
remains the almost certain prospect that the
present run of dry years-and the last two
years have been the driest of this century-will
come to an end and more humid conditions
will return (Lamb, P. J. 1982). But we still do
not know whether these dry cycles are superimposed on some more profound longer cycle,
or whether man is playing an active role in
directly or indirectly accentuating the local or
regional impact of the climatic function
through dust or albedo factors (Quirk 1977;
McLeod 1976; Charney 1975). Even for one of
the most thoroughly researched countries on
earth, the United States, Rosenberg (1986) is
able to show the considerable uncertainty
surrounding the possible consequences of
atmospheric warming over the Great Plains
and beyond. Waggoner (1984) is relatively
optlmistic about adaptation to weather
changes in the U.S. as science and technology
keep pace. Leading scientists are now engaged
in acrimonious debate concerning the incidence of, and possible consequences of, the
"greenhouse effect" of CO, buildup in the
atmosphere. It is not difficult, therefore, to
sympathize with the dilemma facing policymakers in Africa who, even with the best
will in the world, are trying to plan in the
midst of the most profound uncertainty. They,
in contrast to their American colleagues, face
the terribly pressing problem of applying much
more uncertain knowledge to a situation
where the consequences of change are much
more immediate and disastrous to the human
population.
HISTORY, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIETY

The North American Great Plains is an
area that has been subject to relatively recent
colonization. In this regard there appears to be
some similarity with the African continent,
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which was subject to the main thrust of
colonialism (rather than colonization) at
roughly the same time. But there the comparison more or less ends, and it is extremely
difficult to extrapolate data from the Great
Plains to Africa. Although it is possible to
point at events during the Dust Bowl era in
America and perhaps see certain superficial
similarities in the degradation and breakdown
in semiarid Africa today (e.g., the wholesale
migration of people, soil erosion, the role of
technology, etc.), there are some very basic
underlying differences. These may be briefly
summarized as follows:
The strong role of the subsistence sector
in much of semiarid Africa;
The lack of a viable alternative for
employment in other sectors of the
economy;
The lack of any substantial research
base for the major subsistence crops supporting the people;
A situation of severe capital constraint
on the part of most farmers and governments in the region;
The different historical experience: the
superimposition of one culture, economy,
and technology on top of another rather
than the wholesale displacement that took
place in Australia and North America.
During the relatively recent colonial experience that affected virtually all the countries
in semiarid Africa (including, indirectly, Ethiopia), profound changes were made in the
relations between man and the environment.
These territories "paid their way" within the
colonial system by producing cash crops in a
relatively unprocessed form for export. This
commercial strain was grafted onto, rather
than replacing, the existing "traditional" farming systems. Indeed, the colonial authorities
required the maintenance of subsistence farming as a device to subsidize production costs
and to obviate the necessity for social support
payments. Thus colonialism created a demand
for additional land almost overnight. Further-

more, it introduced monocultures of often very
demanding crops. The French West African
empire was very systematically divided into
production zones for cotton, groundnuts, and
so forth. The introduction of taxes payable in
cash ensured that the indigenous population
participated actively in this drive.
On the research front, the efforts were
concentrated almost entirely on proving the
productivity and quality of the cash crops.
Institutes for research on specific crops
proliferated, an example being the Imperial
Cotton Research Institute in Uganda. However, there was no parallel line of major research
into the principal food crops like the millets
and sorghum or into the animals that keep
alive the majority of the population in the dry
zone. Speaking at a Washington meeting in
January 1985, Edmond Hartmans, director of
the Nigeria-based International Institute for
Tropical Agriculture, stated: "Research in food
production in Africa started around 1970. We
shouldn't be surprised that we are only now
beginning to see results" (Norman 1985). In
contrast, the record of research into tropical
cash crops goes back to the eighteenth century.
Much of the doomsday literature on Africa-such as the recently syndicated cartoon
showing the countries of Africa named "West
Ethiopia, East Ethiopia, Emerging Ethiopia"could be replicated by turning back to the
writings on Asia, particularly India, in the
early 1960s. Indeed, the full Malthusian catastrophe for India of a population outstripping
its food-producing capacity was predicted to
occur right about now. Instead, the picture is
very different. In Asia the rate of growth of
food production during the period 1965-75
increased about 20 percent and eliminated
both the massive food imports under the
PL480 plan and commercial purchases. In 1985
Pakistan became an exporter of grain. This was
largely due to the development of the "Green
Revolution" dwarf hybrids of wheat, rice, and
maize and the associated fertilizer/pesticide
!irrigation package. It is true that much has
been written about the socially disruptive
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impact of this technological change, but we
cannot escape the undeniable fact that, for the
moment at least, dire human consequences
have been avoided. How does this dramatic
success relate to Africa?
Over roughly the same period that the
hybrids were being extended at almost
unbelievable speed in Asia, food production in
Africa was barely able-or in many cases was
unable-to keep up with the rate of growth of
the human population. So why was there no
green revolution for Africa? The reasons are
many. First, the Asian dilemma overshadowed
what was happening in Africa so that most of
the research and extension was focused there.
Next, as far as Africa's staple grains are
concerned there was almost no research base
to build on. Such as it was, research focused
essentially on luxury exports to earn foreign
exchange. The African countries, facing recent
declining terms of trade, the impact of oil
shocks, and the growing expectations of the
politically volatile urban power groups, felt
obliged to continue this colonial preoccupation with those commodities that earned
money abroad. Also, it is difficult to raise
funds for research and development work on
crops that essentially have an economic rather
than a financial return, however important
they may be to the food security and general
well-being of the population.
In addition, other factors result in local
complications in effecting an African green
revolution. First, the infrastructure for seed
multiplication (since hybrids cannot reproduce
themselves) is weak or absent, which makes
the distribution of the innovation each year
particularly difficult. Second, farmers who
intend to consume the end product rather
than put it into the commercial market have
no means to pay for such seed. Third, in many
countries the state-controlled pricing system
for that portion of the crop entering the
market is used as a device to "tax" the
countryside to subsidize food for the urban
population, including workers. Such a system,
in effect, for example, in Mali ]..lntil recently,
serves as a major disincentive to the grower.

Fourth, in many countries agriculture simply
has been and is a neglected sector. Examination of the expenditure patterns of governments in the region shows that often as little as
10 percent of state resources are devoted to
this sector, even though 75 percent or more of
the population are engaged in agriculture.
So the economic, social, and political bases
in Africa are often too weak for the sorts of
changes outlined by Rosenberg in his review of
technological advances in the Great Plains.
The effort is only now beginning. Members of
the Organization of African Unity meeting in
Lagos toward the end of the last decade
predicted that attention must be focused on a
greater drive toward food security in Africa.
However, this effort, still in its infancy, takes
time. Some progress may be charted, such as
the development of a hybrid sorghum combining strains bred in Nigeria and at the Texas
A & M University that offers the prospects of
higher yields in the Sudan and elsewhere. But
all this will require a major concerted effort
partly because the delivery system will be that
much more difficult in Africa. Indeed, the new
sorghum strain is attractive largely because the
gains may be achieved without irrigation and
the prospects for irrigation in Africa are seen
as much more problematic than in the Punjab
or elsewhere in south and southeast Asia.
One additional problem is the attitude
toward research on the part of government
officials. So much research in Africa, like water
development in semiarid regions, has had
perverse results when implemented that government officials are often frustrated at the gap
between research and implementation. One
often hears the cry for no more research and a
lot more action. It is clear that the research
effort in Africa has often been characterized by
the following:
Concentration on export crops;
The research station mentality producing answers too often without researching
the real questions ("top-down" approach);
The very late start in researching food
crop hybrids; and
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The lack of a systems approach to
production problems at the farm level and
to overcoming the observable constraints,
including such things as infrastructure and
credit.
Over the last decade we have seen the
growth, often under the aegis of the Consultative Group for International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR), of research centers such as
the one mentioned above in Nigeria and the
International Livestock Center for Africa in
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Mali. However, it is one
thing to effect research on an integrated basis
or on production systems; it is quite another
matter to translate that research into action
when the organs of government are essentially
divided into sectors and uncommunicative.
Unfortunately, governments all too rarely
research themselves. Thus the administrative
dimension remains weak, and yet it may be the
key to any successful transformation. Since it
is this very government structure that defines
the need for and requests technical assistance,
the problem is extended beyond the boundaries of national policymaking. These issues
were discussed in 1979 by UNESCO in a
review of its scientific contribution to the
development of the arid zones, and I have
elsewhere presented a hypothesis with regard
to the role of administrative structure in
tackling global problems that I term the
"Administrative Trap" (Baker 1976).
THE WAY FORWARD

Clearly the way forward is far from easy
since it is beset with a combination of scientific
uncertainties and polemical assertions of rightness by the various apologists; systemic constraints in the decision-making structure; and
a very late start in developing the indigenous
technological base to provide food security.
The Lagos meeting suggests some realization
on the part of the governments of the need for
a change of direction away from the colonial
structure. However, this realization produces
immense problems for those governments

because of their tremendous dependence upon
foreign exchange to fuel the models of development they have adopted, which in turn rely
so much on imports for modernization. Sadly,
the reality is that the rural majority does not
have the political clout of the concentrated
urban minority and so Lipton's "Urban Bias"
prevails, though not necessarily for the reasons
he posits (Lipton 1977).
Time is a precious commodity since it is
needed to confirm the various hypotheses
regarding climatic change; to investigate how
land use aggravates the effects of drought; to
develop the strains and packages of a new
green revolution for Africa; and to overcome
the calamitous effects of the last fifteen years.
Once it is possible to move away from the relief
and crisis-management approach that prevails
at the moment, then we must hope that the
momentum will not be lost simply because
things appear to be "getting better." It is well
known that policymakers have a fairly shortterm time horizon, even if they have not been
elected to office. Indeed, as J. K. Galbraith
observed, "In the long term we are all dead."
The African situation, with its heavy Malthusian overtones, may unfortunately relate more
directly to that observation than to any other.
Still, everyone was saying the same thing
about India in the 1950s and 1960s and we
should derive some hope from that. It is quite
clear that none of the compilers of definitive
reports on the Great Plains could have predicted the wild card of technological change
nor the changing role of grain exports from the
Great Plains. But to hope for an Asian happy
ending in Africa is more like an act of faith
than a prognostication of science.
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